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1940] RECENT DECISIONS 399
within a territory or the District of Columbia, as in this case,5 it is
created by an Act of Congress and classed as a private corporation.
A professor employed by the Board of Directors of a university oc-
cupies a contractual position as an employee. 6 Where a statute in-
corporating the Board authorized it to remove any professor, when,
in their judgment the interests of the university shall require it, as
in the suit at bar,7 such provision became a condition of the contract
for the employment of a professor.8 Therefore, since such provision
became a part of the employment contract which existed between
the appellant and the appellee, the corporation is incapable of making
any contract with a professor for permanent tenure or for a specific
period and not terminable at the discretionary will of the Board of
Trusteesf Consequently, if such a contract were made, it is null and
void.
However, there are cases which do not interpret the statutory
provision as strictly as the above. These cases hold that, although
such provision permits the Board to remove a professor at any time,
the Board can make a contract for a specified length of time, not
subject to removal without cause.10 The theory is that if the courts
were to hold otherwise, it would be difficult for a university to secure
competent talent for its teaching staff, since men of superior ability
might be more interested in a position that gives greater security
than one whose tenure is subject to every whim and fancy of the
Board of Trustees."
However, whether such contract is permissible or not, the trus-
tees are not prevented from discharging a professor prior to the ex-
piration of the contract period, and if they do so without sufficient
cause, the professor, although not entitled to reinstatement, may re-
cover the consequent damages.' 2  The mere fact that damages may
514 STAT. 438 (1867).
6 Brookfield v. Drury College, 139 Mo. App. 339, 123 S. W. 86 (1909).
7 Section 7 of Act of Incorporation provided: "That the board of trustees
shall have power to remove any professor or tutor or other officers connected
with the institution, when, in their judgment, the interest of the university
shall require it."
8 Ward v. Board of Regents of Kansas State Agricultural College, 138 Fed.
372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Hartigan v. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, 49 W. Va.
14, 38 S. E. 698 (1901).
9 Ward v. Board of Regents of Kansas State Agricultural College, 138
Fed. 372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; Devol v. Board of Regents, 6 Ariz. 259, 56 Pac.
737 (1899) ; Hyslop v. Board of Regents, 23 Idaho 341, 129 Pac. 1073 (1913) ;
Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wis. 7, 58 N. W.. 1042(1894) ; State ex rel. Hunsicker v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 209
Wis. 83, 244 N. W. 618 (1932).
10 State Board of Agriculture v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App. 139, 77 Pac. 372
(1904) ; Board of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878) ; Board of Education
v. Cook, 3 Kan. App. 269, 45 Pac. 119 (1896).
11 Board of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223, 230 (1878).
12 State Board of Agriculture y. Meyers, 20 Colo. App. 139, 77 Pac. 372
(1904) ; Board of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878).
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be awarded, does not mean that the Board cannot remove the
appellant.'8
C.G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOREIGN CORPORATION-VALIDITY OF
STATE STATUTE LEVYING TAX FOR PRIVILEGE OF DOING INTRASTATE
BUSINEss.-Petitioner, incorporated under laws of Michigan, owns
and operates a large manufactory of motor vehicles and maintains
assembly plants in Texas. Parts are shipped to Texas, assembled and
sold in intrastate commerce, through dealers, to the public. The State
of Texas imposes a tax upon the gross receipts of the business done
in Texas, in proportion, as that bears to the total gross receipts of the
corporation from its entire business throughout the United States.
Petitioner maintains, (1) the tax imposed by statute 1 is a burden on
interstate commerce, in violation of Article I, Section 8, of the Con-
stitution; 2 (2) that the tax operates to deprive him of his property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The District Court upheld validity of the tax. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Upon certiorari to the
Supreme Court, held, the tax is not unconstitutional. "In a unitary
enterprise, property outside the state, when correlated in use with
property within the state, necessarily, affects the worth of the privilege
within the state." Ford Motor Company v. Tom L. Beauchamp, Sec-
retary of State of the State of Texas, et al., 308 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct.
273 (1939).
There is no question but that the state has the power to make a
charge against a domestic or foreign corporation for the privilege of
transacting intrastate business,3 nor is the state required by the Con-
stitution, in levying this charge, to adopt the best possible taxation
's State Board of Agriculture v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App. 139, 77 Pac. 372
(1904).
I VERxoN's TEXAS STATUTES (1936). "Article 7084. Amount of tax.-
(A) Except as herein provided, every domestic and foreign corporation hereto-
fore or hereafter chartered or authorized to do business in Texas, shall, * * *
each year, pay * * * a franchise tax * * *, based upon that proportion of the
outstanding capital stock, surplus and undivided profits, plus the amount of
outstanding bonds, notes and debentures, other than those maturing in less than
a year from date of issue, as the gross receipts from its business done in Texas
bears to the total gross receipts of the corporation from its entire business,
which tax shall be computed at the following rate for each one thousand
($1,000) dollars or fractional part thereof, one ($1.00) dollar to one million
($1,000,000) dollars, * * *."
2 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8: "Congress shall have power to regulate com-
merce among the several states. * * *"
3 American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 39 Sup. Ct. 522
(1919) ; Matson Navigation Co., et al. v. State Board of California, 297 U. S.
441, 56 Sup. Ct. 553 (1936).
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